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introduction
as a result of recent scandals in the business world, the academic world 
has undergone a profound reflection with regard to the internal consis-
tency of some economic theories which have formed the principal doc-
trines followed in the teaching of business management. the article by 
Ghoshal published in the Academy of Management Learning and Educa-
tion (2005) with the categorical title of “Bad management theories are 
destroying Good management Practices” has pricked the conscience of 
many and inspired others. 
in accordance with the fundamental premises of economic science, all in-
dividuals are motivated by self-interest; that is, all economic agents pursue 
the maximization of their individual utility and they are less inclined to 
virtuous behaviors per se. it is thought that free markets guarantee that 
individual action in search of individual profit will enhance the economic 
well-being of society as a whole. Going back to 1776, a famous phrase by 
adam smith can be encountered (1904, par. i.2.2) “it is not from the benev-
olence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own self-interest”. acting in this manner and 
being driven by an invisible hand, the interests of society are pursued al-
though this was not the original intention.
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la Formación en dirección de empresas desde Una 
perspectiVa más allá del interÉs propio.
resUmen: actualmente existe un intenso debate en círculos académicos 
sobre los principios que tradicionalmente han sustentado las teorías 
económicas y la enseñanza en dirección de empresas. Una de las cues-
tiones más controvertidas es la idea de que el ser humano está motivado 
principalmente por su propio interés. la maximización del beneficio y los 
mecanismos dirigidos a la protección de los intereses de los accionistas 
se han convertido en la esencia de lo que serían unas buenas prácticas 
de dirección empresarial. este artículo propone un cambio de orientación 
hacia una visión más amplia y a la vez más realista a la hora de consid-
erar los valores de los individuos en la esfera de la enseñanza en direc-
ción de empresas.
palabras claVes: teoría de la agencia, cooperación, investigación or-
ganizacional positiva, interés propio, teoría del servidor, formación en di-
rección de empresas
la Formation en direction d’entreprises dans Une 
perspectiVe aU delà de l’intÉrêt personnel
rÉsUmÉ: il existe actuellement un débat académique important concer-
nant les principes qui contribuent à soutenir traditionnellement les théo-
ries économiques et l’enseignement en direction d’entreprises. Une des 
questions les plus discutées est celle de l’idée que l’être humain est mo-
tivé principalement par son propre intérêt. La recherche d’un bénéfice 
maximum et les mécanismes de protection des intérêts des actionnaires 
représentent essentiellement les bonnes pratiques de direction d’entre-
prises. Cet article propose un changement d’orientation et une vision plus 
étendue et réaliste pour considérer les valeurs des individus dans la sphère 
de l’enseignement en direction d’entreprises. 
mots-cleFs : Théorie de l’agence, Coopération, Investigation organi-
sationnelle positive, intérêt personnel, théorie du serveur, Formation en 
direction d’entreprises.
a Formação em direção de empresas sob Uma perspectiVa 
qUe Vai mais alÉm do interesse próprio.
resUmo: atualmente, existe um intenso debate em círculos acadêmicos 
sobre os princípios que tradicionalmente as teorias econômicas e o en-
sino em direção de empresas têm sustentado. Uma das questões mais con-
trovertidas é a ideia de que o ser humano está motivado principalmente 
por seu próprio interesse. a maximização do benefício e dos mecanismos 
direcionados à proteção dos interesses dos acionistas se converteu na 
essência do que seriam umas boas práticas de direção empresarial. este 
artigo propõe uma mudança de orientação a uma visão mais ampla e ao 
mesmo tempo mais realista na hora de considerar os valores dos indivíduos 
na esfera do ensino em direção de empresas.
palaVras-cHaVe: teoria da agência, cooperação, pesquisa organiza-
cional positiva, interesse próprio, teoria do servidor, formação em direção 
de empresas.
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this posture is still vigorously defended by not a few who 
present “liberalism” (Friedman, 2002) as the driving force 
of economic and social progress which has occurred over 
the last 50 years, yielding theories such as transaction cost 
economics and agency theory, which have increasingly 
converged on a pessimistic view of human nature. 
the prevailing idea of homo economicus, that is, the ac-
ceptance that human beings act to obtain the highest pos-
sible well-being for themselves given available information 
about opportunities and other constraints, both natural 
and institutional, on his ability to achieve his predeter-
mined goals, is not always correct and seems to be the 
result of a gloomy vision (Hirschman, 1970), which con-
siders that the main purpose of social theory is to solve the 
problem of restricting the social costs arising from human 
imperfections. according to sen (1987), the simplification 
of Adam Smith’s broad vision of human being is one of the 
main deficiencies in contemporary economic theories. in-
deed, adam smith (1790, par. i.i.1) himself acknowledges:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evi-
dently some principles in his nature, which interest him in 
the fortune of others, and render their happiness neces-
sary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the 
pleasure of seeing it.
Common sense has always recognized that human be-
havior can be influenced by other motives and evidence 
provides overwhelming support to what common sense 
suggests (Ghoshal, 2005). indeed, in the daily observation 
of human behavior, values such as goodness, benevolence, 
nobility and honor, amongst others, are reflected. there 
are acts such as leaving a tip in a restaurant that will never 
be visited again, returning valuable objects found in public 
places or volunteering to participate in a military conflict, 
which do not at all fit into the pessimistic view of human 
nature (Frank, 2004). 
even careful experiments devised by economists come to 
similar conclusions. Consider, for example, the ultimatum 
game, in which one player, designated as the proposer, 
is given the opportunity to propose a division of a cer-
tain sum of money between himself and another player, 
designated as the responder. if the responder accepts the 
proposal, the sum is divided as proposed. if he rejects it, 
neither player receives anything. in any variant of the self-
interest-based model of human behavior, the proposer 
ought to offer only a token sum to the responder, keeping 
the bulk of the amount for herself, and the responder 
ought to accept the proposal, since even a token sum is 
better than nothing, which is the only alternative available 
to him. However, it has been observed that the proposer 
is often willing to share out amounts close to half of the 
sum of money and the responder often prefers to receive 
nothing if it is considered that the proposal is not a fair one 
(Camerer and thaler, 1995; Guth et al., 1982).
therefore, human beings do not always seek to satisfy 
their most immediate interests. on numerous occasions 
there is a cooperative behavior capable of generating trust 
which is difficult to explain in economic terms. an expla-
nation may be found in the theory of natural selection of 
the species, which justifies cooperation between individ-
uals genetically related (Hamilton, 1964). another possible 
argument is the pursuit of benefits based upon long term 
relationships (axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; nowak et al., 
1995) or upon indirect compensations such as the develop-
ment of a good reputation (Gintis et al., 2001; leimar and 
Hammerstein, 2001). and despite all these possible expla-
nations, there still exist situations where people behave 
cooperatively although there is no relationship between 
them, these relations are not repeated, and the possibility 
of any return based on reputation is little or nil (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2002).
in this context, the Positive organizational scholarship 
-Pos- takes a critical theory perspective in order to con-
sider positive human characteristics and the stewardship 
theory admits that pro-organizational behaviors may be 
more satisfying than self-serving behaviors.
this article revises some of the foundations in theories 
widely taught in business schools for the purpose of un-
veiling their weakness to explain actual human behavior. 
once admitted the difficulties about stopping the use of 
prevailing economic theories and the risks taken by those 
who dare to do that, a proposal for a change in direction 
in the teaching of business management towards a wider 
perspective with regard to the individual’s values is pre-
sented. this theoretical reflection contributes to the de-
bate on the topic and encourages to take action.
theoretical approaches
although transaction cost economics and agency theory 
have constituted solid and unshakeable beliefs upon which 
the basic principles that guide business management have 
been built and developed over the last decades, other ap-
proaches such as the one supplied by the Pos or the stew-
ardship theory show that some important questions are 
being left out.
transaction cost economics
according to transaction cost economics, the existence 
of firms has been justified as an alternative to markets in 
coordinating economic transactions (Coase, 1937, 1960). 
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thereby, a hierarchical system based on authority at times 
may be more efficient than the price mechanism upon 
which markets are based. in fact, it is argued that because 
of market imperfections and because prices do not contain 
all relevant economic information to allow parties to make 
a correct decision in their transactions, a certain level of 
uncertainty exists that may be used to achieve private 
benefits, which is to say, the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior appears (Williamson, 1975, 1985). As a result, it 
is necessary to incur costs in order to limit such behavior. 
these costs would come from the search for information 
on the part of the parties involved in the transaction, the 
negotiation required to come to an acceptable agreement, 
the drawing up of contracts, the implementation of struc-
tures to make sure that the other party sticks to the terms 
of the contract, or the imposition of compensatory guaran-
tees if this turns out not to be the case.
taking these costs into consideration, it may be more ef-
ficient to coordinate economic transactions within the firm 
-via a system of authority- instead of negotiation between 
parties. However, is this system not also the cause of op-
portunistic behaviors that originate costs? the answer is 
yes and the costs may be as high if not higher than in the 
market place.
agency theory
the structure established for the governance of firms is 
based on the principle of delegation of authority. never-
theless, the delegation may also be used to make deci-
sions in an opportunistic manner in order to obtain private 
benefits. the words of niccolò machiavelli in The Prince 
(1513) are taken up by Williamson (1985, p. 48): “a pru-
dent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it 
would be against his interest, and when the reasons which 
made him bind himself no longer exist”.
this is related to agency theory, which basic premise is 
the conflict of interests between firms’ shareholders and 
managers due to the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and meckling, 1976). specifically, this theory fo-
cuses on maximizing shareholders wealth and proposes 
that financial incentive schemes and control mechanisms 
might be implemented by firms to align managers’ inter-
ests with those of the shareholders, in order to avoid this 
new situation of opportunism derived from a potential 
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abuse of the delegation. In this respect, Williamson (1985) 
argues that corporate hierarchies emerge to coordinate 
transactions when the costs associated with governance 
mechanisms are lower than the costs of conducting such 
exchanges through the market.
positive organizational scholarship (pos)
Pos (Cameron et al., 2003) is a field that does not favor 
a single theory, but rather positions itself as an umbrella 
term that encapsulates how, when and why individuals 
achieve the good life in organizations. a useful approach 
for defining Pos is to understand the meaning of Positive, 
Organizational and Scholarship. By Positive researchers 
refer to elevating, affirmative, and generative states and 
dynamics. most organizational scholarship focuses on neg-
ative states as well as negative dynamics that lead to those 
states. Pos does not deny the importance of researching 
these negative phenomena. Rather, the field calls for the 
expansion of organizational research to include a more 
purposeful focus on positive phenomena. POS’s emphasis 
on Organizational refers to the importance of situating 
the study of positive phenomena within and across orga-
nizations. Finally, Pos researchers stress the importance of 
Scholarship because this field emphasizes theoretically-in-
formed accounts, backed up by data and analysis, which 
suggest implications for organizational functioning, prac-
tice and teaching. in short, Pos is concerned with the 
scientific study of positive outcomes, processes and attri-
butes of organizations and their members (Cameron et al., 
2003; Cameron, 2006). 
this perspective clearly represents a major step forward in 
reversing the trend by rebuilding a balance between posi-
tive and negative assumptions in the analysis of business- 
and management-related issues. in particular, Cameron 
(2006) proclaimed the need to include the characteristics 
which define virtuousness -such as honor, goodness, be-
nevolence and nobility- in business management training 
programs and not to accentuate only the negative side of 
the spectrum. Virtuousness produces positive energy in sys-
tems, it permits growth and constructs social capital, which 
simultaneously develops intellectual capital and gives rise 
to organizational advantages (nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998; nelson and Cooper, 2007). indeed, Cameron et al. 
(2003) advocated that firms that are ethically based out-
perform those led by managers with low scores in virtu-
ousness, in terms of profitability, productivity, innovation, 
quality, customer retention, and employer loyalty. specif-
ically, “when managerial behaviors rise to a virtue-based 
ethical level akin to what Cameron identified as ‘virtuous-
ness’, then those behaviors represent characteristics found 
in stewardship theory” (Caldwell et al., 2008, p. 154-155).
Positive phenomena have also been examined in the past 
by other traditions and Pos seeks to capitalize on them 
but represents an extension (Cameron et al., 2003). this 
group of scholarly traditions includes positive psychology 
(seligman, 2002), community psychology (Rappaport and 
seidman, 2000), organizational development (Beckhard, 
1969), organizational citizenship behaviour (organ, 1988) 
and corporate social responsibility (Crane et al., 2008).
stewardship theory
Principle-based and founded upon a virtue ethics model, 
the stewardship theory of management (davis et al., 1997) 
is designed for researchers to examine situations in which 
managers as “stewards” are motivated to act in the best in-
terests of the firm. These managers’ conducts are ordered 
in such a way that pro-organizational, collectivistic behav-
iors have higher utility than self-serving, individualistic 
behaviors. also, because stewards perceive greater utility 
in cooperative conduct and behave accordingly, their be-
havior may be considered rational (davis et al., 1997; 
Hernández, 2008). in particular, this theory suggests that 
the maximization of long-term economic wealth will ulti-
mately serve to be in the best interests of the shareholders 
and the various stakeholders collectively, in addition to 
maximizing social welfare and the long-term economic 
benefit to society (Caldwell et al., 2008). thus, this new 
perspective promotes the creation of organizational sys-
tems that reinforce both normative and instrumental 
organizational goals, that is, both social and financial per-
formance (Hernández, 2008).
stewardship theory, which takes a positive view of man-
agers, provides a valuable alternative that can reverse 
the deterioration in public trust that characterizes society 
(Ghoshal, 2005). as practitioners increase their under-
standing of how stewardship theory can enable managers 
to build trust, the ability of firms to achieve social and fi-
nancial performance is likely to increase. in addition, ap-
plying principles of stewardship theory can also help 
business leaders reframe their moral responsibilities, and 
honor the duties that they owe society, as corporate citi-
zens (Caldwell et al., 2008).
reasons for the spread of the 
self-interest perspective
although prevailing economic theories are mainly pre-
occupied with the negative aspects and imperfections 
of human nature, most of economic value is not created 
via market transactions but rather by firms where people, 
with their defects but also their virtues, act collectively 
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and cooperatively guided by a common goal. traditional 
models, instead of concentrating on the creation of eco-
nomic value, have been more concerned with its appro-
priation and the possibility that one party might unfairly 
and opportunistically take advantage of the vulnerabili-
ties of another party. this leads to submission and obedi-
ence, to institutional control becoming an essential task of 
management as opposed to a more positive vision, which 
facilitates cooperation and values initiative, and where 
spreading trust and leading change are seen as the true 
functions of management (Caldwell et al., 2008; Ghoshal 
et al., 1999). thus, if both common sense and evidence 
suggest the contrary, why does the pessimistic model of 
people as purely self-interested beings still so dominate 
management-related theories?
there are various explanations for this. Firstly, Ghoshal 
(2005) states that behind the business management re-
search there is an ideological background which hinders 
its evolution. indeed, a particular ideology, described by 
Friedman (2002) as “liberalism”, has increasingly pen-
etrated most of the disciplines in which management 
theories are rooted. this ideology has led management re-
search in the direction of making excessive truth claims 
based on partial analysis and both unrealistic and pessi-
mistic assumptions. specifically, its influence on business 
management research has been largely mediated by the 
Chicago school, with milton Friedman as one of its main 
exponents. it is through this institution that “liberalism” 
has yield theories such as transaction cost economics and 
agency theory, which are now routinely used to frame our 
research and to guide our teaching.
secondly, one explanation may exist from the demand side 
(Kanter, 2005). The approach based on maximizing share-
holders interests and financial incentives, as agency theory 
proposes, came into vogue in the 1980s in the United 
states, where there was an audience in demand for theo-
ries which avoid that firms remain captive of their man-
agers. although there were those who promoted a wider 
vision which took other stakeholders’ interests into consid-
eration, it was not well received. What was more important 
was the individual interest and, more concretely, that of 
the shareholders, and the teaching of business manage-
ment had to try to respect this premise.
thirdly, another possible justification may be that explan-
atory models are more easily developed and hypotheses 
are more clearly contrasted from traditional management 
theories (Ghoshal, 2005; Kanter 2005). The consideration 
of other motivations apart from profit maximization and 
other stakeholders apart from shareholders, although it is 
a perspective closer to the reality, can not be elegantly 
modelled, that is, it would not readily yield sharp and 
testable propositions, nor would it provide simple and re-
ductionist prescriptions.
Finally, academics may be reluctant to change (Waddock, 
2006). the additional effort that this adaptation needs is 
combined with the fact that it is difficult to publish inno-
vative ideas in this regard. there are already diverse voices 
proclaiming the limitations of a vision that is excessively 
centered on shareholders interests and negative presump-
tions about human nature, but they are finding it difficult 
to be heard even in the academic world.
the danger of self-fulfilling theories
Unlike theories in the physical sciences, theories in the 
social sciences can become self-fulfilling (Ferraro et al., 
2005); that is, it runs the risk that theories influence the 
phenomena studied and this influence may be strong 
enough to convert them into truths. a management theory 
-if it gains sufficient currency- changes the behaviors of 
managers who start acting in accordance with the theory 
(Ghoshal and moran, 1996). specifically, a theory that as-
sumes that people can behave opportunistically and draws 
its conclusions for managing people based on that assump-
tion can induce managerial actions that are likely to en-
hance opportunistic behavior among people. as Ghoshal 
(2005, p. 77) demonstrates, “this is precisely what has 
happened to management practice over the last several 
decades, converting our collective pessimism about man-
agers into realized pathologies in management behaviors”.
The individuals’ propensity to behave opportunistically 
may be influenced by their own perception of the other 
part involved in the transaction, be it an individual, a 
group or an organization (ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; eagly 
and Chaiken, 1992), and by previous conditioners, such as 
their attitudes and values derived from being exposed to 
both conscious and subliminal, diverse stimuli (Krosnic et 
al., 1992).
Concentrating on the first of the mentioned influences, it 
is true that the governance mechanisms of corporate hier-
archies increase the costs of opportunistic behavior and 
hence may reduce the probability that it occurs (Jensen 
and meckling, 1976). However, they may also harm feel-
ings towards the entity, which may result in a greater pro-
pensity to behave opportunistically (davis et al., 1997). 
the net result, therefore, will depend on the relationship 
between these two effects. according to the evidence it 
seems that the net effect is contrary to that predicted by 
Williamson (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). In fact, it must be 
said that practices derived from agency theory in order 
to ensure manager-shareholder interest alignment, such 
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as the distribution of stock options to managers, the in-
crease in the number of independent directors on cor-
porate boards, the separation of the Ceo and Chairman 
positions, or the existence of markets for corporate con-
trol, have not had the expected effects on corporate per-
formance (Ghoshal, 2005). therefore, the agency problem 
has not been solved correctly by taking as valid the pessi-
mistic assumption about human behavior. However, what 
is most curious is that despite the lack of both face validity 
and empirical support, agency theory continues to domi-
nate academic research on corporate governance (daily et 
al., 2003; Pfeffer, 2005).
the impact of the current perspectives 
in the teaching of business management 
on the students’ behavior
With regard to the prior conditioners such as values and 
attitudes of individuals, these will be mainly affected by 
the education received and training. although there ex-
ists some evidence that do not support the claims of critics 
who suggest business education is associated with nega-
tive personal moral philosophies of students (neubaum 
et al., 2009), due to the content of that education it is 
reasonable to wonder whether the teaching in business 
management might be influencing the trend to behave in 
an opportunistic manner, with self-interest outweighing 
all other factors (donaldson, 2002). most of academic re-
search concludes that effectively this is the case. there is 
recent evidence (Ferraro et al., 2005) that suggests that 
economics and business management students tend to 
take on the behavior of a free-rider, enjoying a benefit 
accruing from a collective effort but contributing little 
or nothing to the effort (e.g. marwell and ames, 1981). 
they also cooperate less when confronted with the sce-
nario illustrated by the prisoner’s dilemma (e.g. Frank 
et al., 1993). this scenario is illustrated by the problem 
faced by two accomplices locked in separate cells who 
are given the choice of confessing to the charges -being 
freed if the other accomplice does not confess or being 
jailed for some time if both confess- or not confessing 
-being trialed for a minor offense if neither confesses or 
jailed for a long time if the other accomplice confesses-. 
Experiments (e.g. Carter and Irons, 1991; Kahneman et 
al., 1986 a, b) have also shown that business manage-
ment students tend to behave selfishly in the ultimatum 
game, whose main characteristics were explained above. 
Finally, it has been demonstrated that these students are 
more inclined to succumb to the temptation to act dis-
honestly (e.g. Frank and schulze, 2000) and to cheat in 
order to achieve better marks with less effort because, 
unlike students from other disciplines, they consider this 
conduct less unacceptable (mcCabe and treviño, 1995; 
mcCabe et al., 2006).
it is possible to argue that students with a tendency to be-
have opportunistically act like this due to an innate moti-
vation, such as the desire to accumulate money, and that 
this is predictable even before their studies commence, as 
they often choose to study business management precisely 
because they understand it will help them achieve their 
economic goals. nevertheless, there is empirical evidence 
that proves that this is not always the case. Frank et al. 
(1993) demonstrated that students who did a course in 
economics, having been exposed to the traditional models 
of self-interest, behaved more selfishly than those who 
studied astronomy. more recently, the aspen institute 
(2003) revealed a change in student values after doing 
an mBa, so that the profits obtained by shareholders be-
came more important than the needs of consumers and 
the quality of the product.
in this regard, Ghoshal (2005, p. 76) argues that academic 
research related to the conduct of business and manage-
ment has had very significant and negative influences on 
the practice of management. more specifically, he sug-
gests that “by propagating ideologically inspired amoral 
theories, business schools have actively freed their stu-
dents from any sense of moral responsibility”, that is, ideas 
propagated by traditional economic theories may have 
done much to strengthen the management practices that 
are now being so loudly condemned. thus, even although 
some personal attributes are important determining fac-
tors of human behavior, the ethical code under which 
the business world operates is important and should be 
taught. there will always be examples of abuse, but a so-
ciety that glorifies these abuses will suffer the worst con-
sequences (Gapper, 2005). the misconduct of managers 
in some firms is really not the critical issue. of far greater 
concern is the general discredit of companies as institu-
tions and of management as a profession, caused, at least 
in part, by the adoption of such ideas as taken-for-granted 
elements of management practice.
a proposal for change
several critics contend that business management educa-
tion is in fact irrelevant to practicing managers. mintzberg, 
2004 argued that mBa programs simply provide special-
ized training in functions of business and are unable to 
contribute to the broader practice of management. He 
also suggested that management is a craft that is learned 
and improved through experience, not in the classroom. 
in this regard, Rubin and dierdorff (2009) showed that 
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behavioral competencies indicated by managers to be 
most critical are the very competencies least represented 
in required mBa curricula.
there is cry frustration at the seemingly unending exam-
ples of mismanagement, but also at the frequent ethical 
misconduct, and patterned dishonesty of a society cur-
rently dubbed the cheating culture. according to samu-
elson (2006), the moment has come to make a decision: to 
continue as if the theories that have been historically used 
in the teaching of business management were sufficient to 
face the current challenges; or to give the students the op-
portunity to reflect on the future of businesses as powerful 
agents of change and social force.
the traditional approach, presumably neutral in ethical 
terms and free of moral values, does not allow us to ad-
equately deal with the complex social matters which have 
arisen from technological and political changes of recent 
times (Kuhn, 1998; Pfeffer, 2005). Labelling all motivation 
as self-serving does not explain the complexity of human 
action and such model does not suit the demands of a 
social existence (Frank, 2004). However, embracing other 
human qualities would drastically change our theories, and 
it is necessary that scholars do this in order to adequately 
contribute to the progress of management sciences 
(Caldwell et al., 2008; Shareef, 2007). While prestigious 
business schools, such as the Harvard Business school, 
propose as a mission “to educate managers who make a 
difference in the world” in their website, it is difficult to 
remember a time when the teaching of business manage-
ment has been so criticized as it is being criticized today.
managers owe society and those with whom they work an 
array of normative and instrumental duties that extend 
the obligations of governance beyond the scope commonly 
taught in today’s business schools. Helping students to be-
come more socially responsible and ethically sensitive is a 
significant part of the responsibility of business school aca-
demics, who need to incorporate a more humanistic vision 
of the world (Giacalone and thompson, 2006; shareef, 
2007). thus, if ethical or moral concerns are to be really 
reinstituted in the practice of management, they have to 
be reinstituted first in our mainstream theory. Furthermore, 
if we wish our students contribute to building what Bennis 
(2000) has described as delightful organizations, we will 
have to teach them the theories that describe how they 
can do so. in spite of all the individuals and institutional 
pressures that drive us to paradigmatic conformity, as both 
researchers and teachers we have to define and adopt a 
different path.
the good news is that the endeavor appears to have al-
ready commenced. in fact, new perspectives have emerged 
which explain other type of human behavior beyond the 
economic approach. specifically, Pos and stewardship 
theory provide two valuable alternatives to traditional 
management theories. Both perspectives have their roots 
in psychology and sociology, and they argue for a more 
complex and humanistic model of man.
the change in direction in the teaching of business man-
agement proposed in this paper implies an evolution com-
plementing theories mainly based on self-interest such as 
transaction cost economics and agency theory with other 
perspectives like Pos and stewardship theory, where other-
regarding motives and positive aspects of human being 
have their place. virtuousness, trustworthiness, compas-
sion, resilience, humility, respect, forgiveness, and courage, 
among others, are characteristics to be analyzed and pro-
moted. it is about time to teach how to create contexts 
in which people flourish and to show how creating abun-
dance and human well-being are key indicators of success.
the fact that people in an organization be reliable in their 
work, always tell the truth, care about each other and do 
their best work to improve each others’ well-being is some-
thing relevant because it will build mutual trust within the 
organization and will contribute to its success. among the 
set of inherent distinguishing characteristics that make up 
human nature can be found all the necessary to reach this 
goal. it is just a matter of unveiling those characteristics 
and deal with them. nevertheless, focusing on the positive 
human condition does not mean forgetting the negative, 
but taking a whole picture of the real situation.
managing organizations means making actions be exe-
cuted by people, so it is vital to understand the human 
component of organizations. it is not only the expected 
behavior of people and the process they go through when 
they make a decision what matters but also the interac-
tion among everyone’s decisions from a dynamic point of 
view (Pérez lópez, 1991). admitting a broader perspec-
tive of human nature in business management would help 
to come up with new ways of facing complex and turbu-
lent situations. specifically, aktouf (1992) insisted in the 
need for revalorizing human capital in recessionary con-
texts giving workers more control over their working con-
ditions and fostering cohesiveness, complicity, initiative 
and creativity at all levels. adler (2006) pointed out that 
companies in the twenty-first century require leaders able 
to design options worthy of implementation and that ap-
plying yesterday’s approaches to business is not enough any 
longer. High levels of inspiration and passionate creativity 
are demandes, which are also positive attributes found in 
human beings. However, these qualities have been more 
the domain of artists than of most managers. that is why 
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leading business schools worldwide are adding arts-based 
courses to their curriculum and this trend should probably 
be reinforced. starkey and tempest (2009) take a step fur-
ther and defend that an arts and humanities-based design 
approach might lead business schools. a new vocabulary 
and a new narrative for our complex and troubled times 
must be designed. moreover, education is about inspiring 
to think critically in a challenging manner and artistic rec-
reation may help to reach that goal. teaching can be seen 
as a drama in which a script is not always strictly followed 
but improvisation emerges from the interaction between 
the teacher and the students to take you to creative solu-
tions to challenging situations.
Another important component of today’s business man-
agement is sustainability. sustainable economic growth 
is a concept originally proposed by the World Commis-
sion on environment and development in the 1980s after 
admitting that economic growth without any limits was 
physically impossible. sustainability implies moderated 
growth so as to satisfy the needs of the current genera-
tion without jeopardizing the needs of future generations 
(WCED, 1987). Marshall et al. (2010) state that an exami-
nation and transformation of how and what we teach is 
something indispensible in the age of sustainability. in this 
context, although there some empirical evidence that busi-
ness management education could be helpful to improve 
corporate environmental performance (slater and dixon-
Fowler, 2010), shrivastava (2010) says that most business 
courses focus exclusively on cognitive and analytical skills 
but sustainable organizing and managing require also 
physical and emotional or spiritual skills. it is our challenge 
to seek out new ways of infusing excitement and passion 
for sustainability into our courses.
if these new perspectives and practices, and others that 
are emerging, are fully incorporated into the bounds of the 
teaching of business management, a significant change in 
the way firms are run will occur. to make this come true, 
a big effort has to be made by many business school aca-
demics so as to reverse the overall trend of the last 50 
years.
conclusions
Considering the various business scandals that took place 
two decades ago, business schools are beginning to be 
considered responsible for creating ethical leaders. there 
is evidence that students’ decisions are less ethical than 
those of the practitioners (Glenn and van loo, 1993). tra-
ditional theories such as transaction cost economics and 
agency theory, which represent the base of a great part of 
business schools’ curricula, have had a harmful impact on 
values, attitudes, and the behavior of students (Ghoshal, 
2005). these perspectives are based on unrealistic and 
pessimistic assumptions, and they have increasingly con-
verged on the notion of human behavior as being self-
serving, at considerable cost to students, to companies, 
and to society.
the problem resides in that such theories can become self-
fulfilling because they shape institutional designs and 
management practices as well as social norms and expec-
tations about behavior, thereby creating the behavior they 
predict (Ferraro et al., 2005). that is, a theory that assumes 
that people behave opportunistically can change the be-
havior of managers who start acting in accordance with 
the theory; a theory that assumes that managers cannot 
be trusted can make managers less trustworthy. as a re-
sult, by propagating traditional theories, business schools 
have freed their students from any sense of moral or eth-
ical responsibility. since morality, or ethics, is inseparable 
from human intentionality, a precondition for making busi-
ness studies a science has been the denial of any moral 
or ethical considerations in current management theories 
and, therefore, in prescriptions for management practice.
although the majority of economists would agree that 
people in general worry about more than their own mate-
rial well-being and they also take into consideration others’ 
well-being, few economists include this wider perspective 
in their models of human behavior (Frank, 2004). despite 
the fact that propensity to cooperate and many other posi-
tive human conducts are a response to certain values, as 
intrinsic in the individual as may be opportunistic behavior; 
they do not seem to merit the same attention. in fact, this 
other reality has not been explored by traditional theories, 
which are above all preoccupied about the negative as-
pects of human nature.
Bearing in mind the negative consequences of such the-
ories for management practice and therefore society at 
large, there is a need for a careful reconsideration of the 
path being followed by researchers and teachers of busi-
ness management to define whether it is the correct one. 
Ultimately if the trend in management theory is to be re-
versed, only business school academics can do so. in this 
regard, several scholars have recently voiced their concerns 
about the current state of both management research and 
teaching, and they have proposed to expose students to 
an alternative model of behavior (Ghoshal, 2005; Wad-
dock, 2006; shareef, 2007). admitting a broad view of 
human nature gives cause for new theories to be taught 
and new ways to teach business management in order to 
exploit positive attributes such as trustworthiness, respect, 
creativity, inspiration or passion, just to mention a few, 
j o u r n a l
r e v i s t a
innovar
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for the benefit of the organizations and society. However, 
any change in this field will demand not only sufficient 
reflection, but also will and courage. From the new paths 
that are being opened it is more difficult to design elegant 
models with readily testable propositions or to prescribe 
simple management practices (Kanter, 2005). For this 
reason, these newly formed efforts have not been widely 
recognized in terms of potential publications and as such 
may be detrimental to the academic and professional ca-
reer of whoever takes it on (Waddock, 2006). Despite it all, 
it seems to be a necessity, obligation and basic responsi-
bility for business school academics to take the aforemen-
tioned risk with the ultimate aim of changing the trends of 
the last decades and offering a wider and richer panorama 
in the teaching of business management (Giacalone and 
thompson, 2006).
the review of the prevailing theories and their weaknesses 
shown here can be seen by some teachers and researchers 
as a stimulus to find new ways to face their difficult tasks. 
others will prefer to insist on the advantages derived from 
the more traditional perspectives. in any case, one conclu-
sion can be reached: it is about time to research into the 
accuracy and consequences of the ideas we disseminate 
before going on.
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